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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cooperation of all will be essential if the pollution caused by the dumping
of wastes in the ocean is to be dealt with effectively and comprehensively.
JOSEPH R. JOHN
International Law-Oil Spills and Their Legal Ramifications
Historically, man has demonstrated an unfortunate tendency to
become the victim of his own technological achievements. Nowhere has
this inability to cope with progress been more apparent thai in the
exploitation and shipment of oil. Although oil is the lifeblood of our
industrialized society, it has the potential to devastate both the ecology
and the economy. This realization has recently exploded in the context of
increasing domestic and international concern in the wake of the Torrey
Canyon incident and the blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel.
Although the issues have been brought into sharp focus by these events,
practical solutions are not yet available. At best, these tragedies have
only served to point out the painful inadequacy of existing legislative and
conventional authority in the area of oil spills and their legal
ramifications.
THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT
The events surrounding the sinking of the Torrey Canyon in March,
1967, supplied much of the impetus for the present level of public
concern. The problem of oil pollution, however, is neither new nor
limited to such spectacular events. Reports date back to 1754, when the
Russians added another "first" to their long series of exploits by
becoming the first to pollute the sea with oil.' In that case a portion of
the Caspian Sea off Baku was defiled by the leakage of a quantity of
bulk oil cargo in wooden bottoms. Even before industry's conversion
from steam to oil-the point at which many commentators believe oil
pollution became a major concern 2 -domestic legislation seeking to
counteract the threat was already in existence.3 Nevertheless, it took two
'Stubbs, Oil Pollution: Penalty and Damage Aspects, 16 U.S.N. JAG J. 140 (1962).
"Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400,406 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Nanda].
3E.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 329. Even though the Act did not specifically
prohibit the dumping of oil in New York habor, subsequent laws with similar wording have been
construed to prohibit such discharges. See The S.S. Nea Hellis, 116 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1941).
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world wars and half a century of technological progress to bring the
problem into its true perspective.
Today, tankers carry over 700 million tons of petroleum and
petroleum products annually.4 Their number, though representing forty
percent of the world ocean traffic,5 is far less significant than their
individual capacities. While the standard tankers of two decades ago
averaged 16,000 deadweight tons,6 their modern progeny commonly
exceed 100,000 tons. 7 With the recent launching of the 312,000 ton
Universe Ireland, even tankers of this latter class may be destined for
obsolescence. 8
It was almost inevitable that a tragedy reflecting these technological
advances would eventually occur. That fear became reality on March 18,
1967, when the 118,000 ton Torrey Canyon ran aground on the Seven
Stones reef off the coast of Cornwall, England. Driven by strong winds
and high seas, the oil dispersed across the channel, killed thousands of
seabirds and millions of fish, and contaminated oyster beds, fisheries,
and one hundred forty miles of the Cornish coast?
Although claims growing out of the disaster may run as high as two
billion dollars,1" the true cost cannot be measured monetarily. In terms
of detrimental effects on the environment, and particularly on the chain
of marine life, the extent of the damage, if known, would stagger the
imagination.
Surprisingly, such tragedies, however dramatic, are not the primary
'Edwards, Oil Pollution and the Law, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 21, 23 (S.
Degler ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
Nanda 01-02.
'Ludwigson, Oil Pollution at Sea, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 1 (S. Degler ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Ludwigson].
'Id. Most of the progress in this area is directly attributable to the American petroleum
industry, which, in attempting to meet the demands of the post-war recovery in Western Europe and
Japan, discovered the economies of scale. In terms of capital outlay and operating and
administrative costs, today's "supertankers" are far more economical than their smaller ancestors.
E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER 11-14 (1968).
8See Ludwigson 8.
'Nanda 400. Restorative efforts were largely ineffectual. Attempts to set the oil afire with
napalm, powdered magnesium and other incendiary weapons met with little success, as the rising
steam quickly snuffed out the flames. Similarly, floating booms and other methods of physical
collection proved difficult due to the localized heavy seas. Once the oil reached shore, the British
made generous use of detergents, but this too had to be discontinued because of the effect on the
marine life. Ludwigson 3-4.
"Ludwigson 4. Excluding private claims, suits by the British and French governments totaled
sixteen million dollars. Id.
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cause of oil pollution." Instead, the bulk of such discharges are
preventable. Bilge pumping, ballast dumping and carelessness in
shoreside fueling operations account for a large part of the estimated 100
million tons of oil spilled into the sea annually. 12
The oil spill in the Santa Barbara Channel illustrates that man's
impatience to secure the benefits of his discoveries without first
investigating the possible hazards is not limited to the shipment of oil
alone. In that instance, the federal sale of petroleum leases had brought
the largest total amount, 13 the largest amount for a single tract, 4 and the
highest per acre bid'5 ever for an offshore lease-sale. Despite pleas by
local residents and conservationists to extend a two mile buffer zone
established earlier by the Department of the Interior, the Secretary
refused to widen the area, arguing that the zone had already cost the
government 100 million dollars in bonuses and an additional 500 million
dollars ip future royalties. 6 On January 28, 1969, the first successful well
on Tract 402 suffered a severe blowout during the withdrawal of a worn
drill bit. Although the well was quickly capped, the increased pressure
forced large quantities of oil through fissures in the sea's floor, and
within a few days oil covered a large portion of the two hundred square
mile channel. 7 A second seepage expanded this area to include four
hundred square miles of the Pacific Ocean and forty miles of white sand
beaches. 8 It was not until the damage was evident that the Secretary of
the Interior heeded the earlier warnings and admitted the lack of
knowledge concerning local geological conditions. 9 Meanwhile, suits
"Edwards 23.
"Nanda 402-03. In considering the extent of the threat, one should not ignore the 150 ships
lying on the floor of the Atlantic off the U.S. coast. Like ghosts returning to haunt the living, the
five million barrels of oil contained within them have been blamed for recent pollutions of Virginia,
New Jersey, and Cape Cod beaches. Id. at 403.
"Note, Continental Shelf Oil Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 113 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Oil Disasters]. The high bids which were accepted
by the federal government as an aggregate sales price totaled 603,204,284 dollars. Channel Sale
Swamps Offshore Records, 66 OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 12, 1968, at 66.
"Oil Disasters 113. A four-company group of bidders, headed by Union Oil Company,
captured single-lease honors at a cost of 61,418,000 dollars. Channel Sale Swamps Offshore
Records, supra note 13.
"Oil Disasters 113.
"Added Santa Barbara Sale Curbs Rapped, 65 OIL AND GAS J., Dec. 4, 1967, at 40.
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 19, col. I.
"SeeTim, Feb. 14, 1969, at23.
"167 OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 17, 1969, at 43.
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exceeding one billion dollars had been filed against both the United
States and Union Oil Company.20
It would be encouraging to believe that lessons have been learned
from the Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara incidents. Yet, reliable
evidence to the contrary exists. Offshore drilling continues at even
greater depths, and increasing numbers of supertankers-heavily laden
with oil-continue to ply the seas. All of the indicatQrs point to the fact
that the problem of oil pollution is here to stay, and since progress
cannot be impeded, the only means of effective regulation must lie in the
law.
EXISTING REGULATORY MEASURES
The United States is signatory to a number of international
conventions concerning oil pollution. However, none of these agreements
provide the control necessary for effective protection. Foremost among
the multilateral instruments is the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil.2' The agreement:
Defines prohibited zones. . . in which discharges of oil are regulated.
Requires logging of oil discharges and losses.
Obliges signatory governments to promote the installation of oil-
receiving facilities in their ports.
Sets procedures for apprehension and prosecution of vessels which
violate the provisions of the Convention.22
Though all nations probably share a common interest in the treaty's
objectives, conflicting domestic policies frequently discourage the
adoption of its provisions. In such situations, the economic advantages
gained by attracting ships to a nation's registry may induce the nation to
provide less stringent regulatory measures than those prescribed by the
1954 Convention.23 Similarly, the abstract nature of long-range interests
often yields to immediate economic expediency, and thus leads to
nonobservance by individual ships. 24 The frequency of such deliberate oil
discharges had been noted above,23 and it is virtually impossible to
"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at I, col. 3.
"May 12, 1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900.
"Edwards 24.
"2Nanda 405.
24d.
"See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
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identify the specific offender. Finally, the 1954 Convention suffers the
weakness common to all treaties in that it is applicable only to ships
registered by the signatory parties.
The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
produced three instruments which may lay the groundwork for more
effective control in the future. The first of these agreements is the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas. 26 In obliging each nation to promulgate
regulations to prevent pollution "by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed
and its subsoil," 2 7 it provides some implementation for the 1954
Convention.
The second agreement which grew out of the Conference is the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 2 As applied to
the United States, this instrument permits the federal government to
exercise controls necessary to prevent violations of its sanitary
regulati6ns within its territory or territorial sea to a point extending
twelve miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is
measured.2 1 In the event this treaty is self-executing, 3 it would sanction
enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 3 anywhere within a twelve
mile zone adjacent to the coast of the United States.
In an attempt to cope with the problems of offshore drilling, the
Conference also drafted the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf.32 While endeavoring to lend some international recognition to the
occupation of the shelf, it is' rapidly becoming inadequate in its
definitional provisions. This fact is amply illustrated by its
"exploitability" test in determining what constitutes the continental
shelf.3 Today, offshore drilling in depths up to five thousand feet is
"April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
111d. at 2319.
"April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
2Id. at 1612.
"There appears to be some question on this point, and in an effort to resolve any doubts, the
President-has recommended specific implementing legislation for the Convention. Edwards 25.
"'Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316,43 Stat. 604, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964). "Under
amendments contained in the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, the term
'discharge'-originally intended to cover any escape of oil-is defined as 'grossly negligent, or
willful spilling of oil.' Because of its wording, the 1924 Act is extremely difficult to enforce." Oil
Disasters 121.
uApril 29, 1958, [1964] I U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
"For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as refering (a) to
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
l000 [Vol. 49
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becoming feasible. In the future, as all parts of the ocean floor become
"exploitable," permanent platforms in the North Sea may not only
threaten the quality of the water but may also jeopardize navigation in
general .3
POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Presently, one of the major obstacles to the effective control of oil
pollution lies in the lingering concept of the supremacy of the law of the
flag on the high seas. The widespread use of flags of convenience
accentuates this problem by frequently leaving the real victim of a
pollution disaster at the mercy of a nation whose interests are motivated
more by economics than ecology.35 In such situations, it has been
suggested that the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction should yield to a
principle conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon both the nation of the
flag and the injured nation.3 Besides affording a sympathetic tribunal to
the coastal nation, such an approach would avoid the serious political
consequences which might flow from extreme measures of self-help in
the event of a pollution crisis. 37
With such a jurisdictional concept serving as a foundation, the
the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred metres or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of said
areas.
Id. at 473.
31Oil Disasters 125-26.
"-See Nanda 404-05. The International Court of Justice pointed out in an advisory opinion that
despite the foreign ownership of many vessels registered in Liberia and Panama, these two countries
are among the eight "largest ship-owning nations." Advisory opinion on Constitution of the
Maritime Safety Committee of the IMCO, [1960] I.C.J. 150.
'-Oil Disasters 126. Though such an approach might be suggested by the S.S. "Lotus," [1927]
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, it has since been dispelled by Article 6 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas which provides:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly
provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, para. 1, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200.
3r'The political consequences potentially arising from the jurisdictional complexities of the
Torrey Canyon are staggering. The ship was American-owned, Liberian-registered, manned by an
Italian crew, and on a single-voyage charter to the British Petroleum Company. It went aground in
international waters and, after being abandoned by the owners, was destroyed through the
combined efforts of British naval and air forces. Finally, it was contracted for salvage to a Dutch
company. See generally COWAN, supra note 7 and Nanda 401. The situation has been aptly termed
"a law professor's examination question dream." Oil Disasters 117 n.29.
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existing law could be used as a basis for more effective agreements in the
areas of prevention, compensation, and enforcement. Within this first
class might fall comprehensive treaties modeled after the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone or instruments which extend
the prohibited zones under the 1954 Convention.
A multilateral convention assigning sealanes between various
international ports of call would also be worthy of consideration."
Similarly, treaties requiring the installation of more sophisticated
navigational aids or establishing rigid standards for ship construction
might further serve to reduce the hazards of collisions at sea. 9
The problem of compensation can be divided into two distinct
subclasses-remuneration and restoration. Efforts to afford the injured
nation just compensation in the former area could take the form of
treaties prescribing strict liability for oil spills, except when necessary to
save human life.4" In order td assure that adequate funds are available, it
has beeh suggested that nations require spillage insurance as a
prerequisite to registration under their flags.4 Alternatively, the
establishment of an international fund to which shipbuilders or
shipowners would contribute in a method akin to an international tax
might also be feasible.4" The problem of restoration could best be
handled by a multilateral instrument founded on one
principle-cooperation. By assuring the availability of the latest
discoveries in absorbents and chemical dispersants, no state would fear
the futility that Great Britain experienced following the Torrey Canyon
disaster.4 3
Regardless of the methods by which the problems of prevention and
compensation are approached, they will prove ineffectual unless some
competent agency is bestowed with enforcement authority. The most
obvious body to accept this responsibility would be the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO), under
whose auspices the 1954 Convention was prepared. At present, however,
this specialized agency of the United Nations has no such authority, and
its miniscule budget prevents it from exerting more than a minimal
influence on such a weighty problem.44
"Nanda 421-22 & n. 196.
"Id. at 420-22.
"°Id. at 424.
411d.
2Oil Disasters 128.
4'Se note I0 supra.
"Edwards 26-27.
[Vol. 491002
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The possible solutions outlined above are neither exhaustive nor
totally adequate in themselves. Yet, they do provide a step in the right
direction. In order to meet the complexities of this changing world, man
must not be content to indict technology itself, for in so doing he is but
indirectly blaming his own inability or unwillingness to secure
cooperation in the international community. If he is not to fall victim to
his environment, he must be willing to act and to compromise within a
legal framework.
WILLIAM W. MAYWHORT

